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Abstract  
 
 
The euphoria which emerged in the late 1980s with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and 
the spread of democratic regimes has been replaced in recent years by a sombre 
backlash against civil society on many levels and fronts. This has  particularly 
intensified following the attacks on September 11 and the ensuing global war on terror.  
This working paper examines the causes of the backlash against civil society within the 
context of the War, describes the overt and implicit manifestations of that backlash, 
and reflects upon the implications for the future.  It considers how the growing 
prominence of security concerns and the concomitant expansion of counter-terrorist 
measures across the world threaten the spaces for civil society to flourish and act.   It 
argues that while the manifestations of the backlash, such as the crackdown on NGOs 
in Russia or the taming of NGOs by bilateral and multilateral agencies, may appear to 
be disparate, unconnected phenomena, on closer inspection it is clear that they are 
intricately intertwined.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The euphoria which emerged in the late 1980s with the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall and the spread of democratic regimes has been replaced in recent years by a 
somber backlash against civil society on many levels and fronts1. This has  particularly 
intensified following the attacks on September 11 and the ensuing global war on terror, 
which is increasingly being referred to as the ‘long war’ on terror (LWOT).2
  The War has crystallized many pre-existing questions around civil society.   
Within the context of  LWOT we can observe a spectrum of phenomena which point to 
a backlash. These range from at the one end the renewed, systematic repression of civil 
society in authoritarian states and ‘managed democracies’3 (Colton and McFaul 2003)  
to at the other end a more general querying of the probity of civil society 
organizations, especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs).4   The claims of 
NGOs to representativeness, comparative effectiveness, to operating democratically 
and their proximity to their constituencies/clients are being challenged not only by 
governments but also by social movements and non-NGO civil society organizations.    
In the meantime donor agencies are attempting to ‘tidy up’ their relations with civil 
society organizations through better- managed partnership arrangements, whilst the 
UN is promoting ‘disciplined networks’ (United Nations 2004: 32) to better handle the 
cacophony of diverse and sometimes conflicting civil society voices.  
This essay examines the causes of the backlash against civil society within the 
context of the LWOT, describes the overt and implicit manifestations of that backlash, 
and reflects upon the implications for the future.  It considers how the growing 
prominence of security concerns and the concomitant expansion of counter-terrorist 
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measures across the world threaten the spaces for civil society to flourish and act.   It 
argues that while the manifestations of the backlash, such as the crackdown on NGOs 
in Russia or the taming of NGOs by bilateral and multilateral agencies, may appear to 
be disparate, unconnected phenomena, on closer inspection it is clear that they are 
intricately intertwined. Moreover, they may well intensify as the Global War on Terror 
transforms into the Long War on Terror and further calls into question the intentions 
and political loyalties  of civil society actors.  
The paper  begins by examining the overt backlash against civil society 
organizations, and in particular NGOs receiving foreign funding, that is emerging in 
authoritarian regimes and reluctant or ‘managed’ democracies such as China, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Nigeria.  It then considers the more implicit forms of 
backlash such as the disciplining and taming of civil society,  which began in the late 
1990s but have intensified in the context of LWOT.  We consider how the LWOT has 
implications for civil societies not just in new or emerging democracies but also in 
older, more established democratic states.  We examine how this multi-layered 
backlash is manifested and how it is a product of local political developments as well 
as the policies, discourses, and practices of the LWOT.  Furthermore, we consider how 
concerted efforts at ‘building civil society’ by development agencies from the late 
1980s onwards have had unintended consequences. These include repression from host 
states that are increasingly suspicious of  civil society as well as criticism from 
grassroots groups and social movements toward NGOs which consider the latter as 
having been co-opted by development agencies. 5
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2. The Rise and Fall of an Ideal  
 
 
Civil society was not used as an analytic concept or as a mobilizing discourse 
25 years ago. It was dissident intellectuals in Eastern Europe who revitalized the 
concept of civil society in the 1980s to express their resistance to authoritarian rule and 
their aspirations for a more democratic polity with a continued role for state regulation. 
The concept of civil society soon became a rallying cry against oppressive regimes in 
Latin America, the Soviet Union and Africa. Development agencies gradually 
absorbed and appropriated the idea of civil society  into their discourses and policies 
subsequently making it a central part of their aid programmes to developing and 
transition countries.   
Donors embraced the idea of civil society development as critical to 
democratization, good governance, and development.  Their euphoria for civil society 
arose out of a combination of factors. These included the growing disillusion of  
Western governments and donors with state-led development in the newly independent 
post-colonial states,  the ascendancy of the neoliberal paradigm of New Public 
Management which supported the roll-back of the state and the privatization of social 
service delivery, and the growing emphasis on democracy promotion in US foreign 
policy which advocated greater civic participation and good governance.  In this 
context civil society promotion became a new mantra in both aid and diplomatic 
circles (Ottaway and Carothers 1998: 6) as the concept became part of everyday donor 
currency. Donor agencies began setting-up special civil society units, creating civil 
society liaison positions, and establishing programmes to strengthen civil society 
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(Howell and Pearce 2002). In doing so they defined civil society to include a larger 
array of organizations such as trades unions, professional associations, faith-based 
groups, media than just NGOs, though in practice they continued to work mainly with 
NGOs. In many transition and developing countries, where the infusion of donor 
funding led to an unprecedented growth in the numbers of NGOs,  civil society came 
to be locally equated with the development and growth of NGOs.  
Although the late 1980s and the 1990s were a honeymoon period for civil 
society and the aid industry, where civil society seemed to promise democratization 
and an alternative to the state and the market, this situation would not last long.   From 
the mid-1990s onwards perceptions of civil society began to change for multiple 
reasons and there was growing unease about what civil society could realistically 
deliver.  The threads of disquiet were ranged along a number of fronts. UN 
parliamentarians, national governments and southern NGOs were beginning to query 
the legitimacy of northern NGOs to represent and articulate the concerns of poor 
people in the South. As donor agencies began to channel more of their aid through 
northern NGOs, the demand for greater upward accountability to donors increased and 
provided a context for questioning the apparent efficiency, flexibility and probity of 
NGOs. Social movements became increasingly uneasy about the professionalization 
and deradicalization of NGOs as former activists now became consultants to 
governments and implementers or sub-contractors of donor and government funded 
projects.  Though the end of the Cold War had heralded the emergence of a new 
paradigm of development that revolved around the trinity of state, market and civil 
society, the debate about the desired roles of these different actors was by no means 
resolved.  As donors increased their engagement with civil society, they also struggled 
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to identify the appropriate modalities of engagement. Working with civil society 
proved far more complex and time-consuming than donors had anticipated. Donors 
lamented the apparent high transaction costs of dealing with a myriad of civil society 
organizations and monitoring the relatively small and dispersed amounts of money 
involved. Though newly emerging democracies and authoritarian regimes that were 
opening up were more tolerant than their predecessors to civil society actors and 
organizations, nevertheless they remained inherently uneasy about civil society, 
suspicious of its intentions and fearful of dissent and critique.  
The September 11 attacks constituted a historical moment, a point of 
convergence and juncture where these growing threads of disquiet came together.  
Indeed the Global War on Terror, which was launched immediately following the 
September 11 attacks, provided a language for justifying a backlash against civil 
society (Howell 2006). It created a climate of fear and suspicion, the demonization and 
criminalization of particular communities and their organizations, and the partial 
silencing of political dissent in the US and in other Western states which had become 
or could potentially become targets of terrorist attacks. The launch of the Global War 
on Terror also provided fuel for certain regimes in various transition and developing 
countries to clamp down on the activities of civil society organizations by using the 
logic and discourses of the War to justify their actions.  In the next two sections we 
examine more closely the overt and implicit expressions of this backlash against civil 
society. 
 
Civil Society Working Paper No 26      11                                         
The Backlash against Civil Society in the Wake of the Long War on Terror - Jude Howell, Armine Ishkanian, 
Ebenezer Obadare, Hakan Seckinelgin, and Marlies Glasius 
 
3. Overt Backlash: Pressure  from  ‘Managed’ Democracies and 
Authoritarian Regimes on Civil Society   
 
 
In the wake of the ‘color’ revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, 
Western support for civil society in these countries began attracting criticism from 
governments throughout the former Soviet states and led to the adoption of laws 
restricting NGO activity as well as more insidious forms of repression.  The most 
notable example is that of Russia where in direct response to the color revolutions and 
using the language of LWOT the Russian Duma passed a bill that promises to greatly 
restrict NGO activity by providing the authorities with greater powers to regulate and 
monitor the work, expenditures and financing of NGOs.    The Russian authorities 
maintain that their actions are not radically different from those taken by Western 
countries, such as the US,  and that they are simply attempting to safeguard Russia’s 
national security by monitoring organizations which might be used for money-
laundering or for fomenting political unrest (BBC 8/12/2005; RFE/RL 24/11/2005).   
While the growing backlash against civil society in Russia is justified with the logic 
and discourses of LWOT, there is also a historical  tendency towards authoritarianism 
in Russia and some of the tactics employed by the Russian authorities are reminiscent 
of Soviet-era practices.  For instance, immediately following the signing of the NGO 
bill in early January 2006 there was a scandal in which British diplomats were accused 
of spying in Moscow and of making clandestine payments to Russian human rights 
NGOs.  The British government denied that it had been involved in any improper 
conduct with Russian NGOs. Hundreds of Russian NGOs meanwhile  released a 
statement arguing that accusations made on Russian television by the authorities were  
reminiscent of Soviet-style denunciations  (Human Rights in Russia).  
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Russia is not alone; there has always been and there continues to be a tendency 
for practices and policies in Russia to spread to the other former Soviet states and is 
most intensely manifested in many of the Central Asian countries.   In Kazakhstan, for 
instance, President Nursultan Nazarabayev issued warnings to NGOs in September  
2005 cautioning them from ‘interfering’ in local affairs and has pushed for new 
legislation that is similar to the Russian bill which will institute strict guidelines on the 
work of foreign and domestic NGOs (RFE/RL 13/9/05).   In Tajikistan, a country 
which is highly dependent on foreign aid, the government is also proposing a law to 
regulate and monitor NGOs because of a growing concern over the political activities 
of NGOs (Pylenko 2006).   Even in Kyrgyzstan, which had been considered one of the 
more democratic of the Central Asian states and which experienced its own color 
revolution in April 2005, there are also moves by the government to restrict NGOs. In 
January 2006 for instance the Kyrgyz Minister of Justice said that it was necessary to 
monitor the activities of NGOs because it was important for the Kyrgyz state security 
services to know if NGOs posed a threat to national security (RFE/RL 01/02/2006).  
The most extreme example of repression comes from Uzbekistan where the authorities 
have smothered the independent, domestic NGO sector and driven nearly all 
independent organizations underground following the violent events in Andijan in May 
2005.  With the passage of amendments to the Code of Administrative Liability by the 
Uzbek Parliament on 3 December 2005,  many international organizations, both NGOs 
and media outlets including RFE/RL, the BBC, Freedom House, and the Eurasia 
Foundation, have also been closed while others are threatened with closure (IRINnews 
9/5/06).  
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In China meanwhile, the government has since late spring 2005 begun to 
investigate foreign NGOs in China and domestic NGOs receiving grants from external 
sources. Conferences on topics perceived as sensitive such as labor issues that involve 
external sponsorship were postponed. Plans to draft a new law on social organizations 
in China were delayed again as the government looked afresh at the activities of 
NGOs, especially foreign or foreign-funded groups. Hopes that the constraining 
regulation requiring domestic social organizations to identify a supervisory agency 
(guakao danwei) were dashed as government anxiety about civil society groups 
mounted. Moreover a review of NGOs that registered under the Industrial and 
Commercial Bureau, not least so as to avoid the more stringent requirements for 
registration with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, led to the closure of several NGOs 
carrying out activities deemed politically sensitive.  Even though the US government 
through its development agencies has not been able to carry out any extensive 
democracy promotion work in China compared with the ex-Soviet states, the Chinese 
government’s concern about rising social instability has prompted an over-reaction to 
events in Russia and elsewhere.  Like other authoritarian states it has also skillfully 
deployed the legitimating discourse of terrorism to counter secessionist movements on 
its western borders. In April 2005 it signed a memorandum of understanding with 
members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization6 and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States to cooperate amongst other things on counterterrorism, the chief 
target here being so-called East Kurdistan terrorist forces (Howell 2006).   
        Among the newly emerging democracies or democratic movements in Africa, the 
resurgence of civil society epitomized a new language of engagement with the state, in 
particular the diffusion of apparently new principles on the basis of which aspirations 
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to social justice, democracy, human rights, and equitable economic opportunities could 
be launched. In many cases, this new idiom was articulated by service-oriented NGOs, 
many of which had arrived on the public scene primarily to complement state 
provision of crucial social infrastructure.  By the late 1990s, multi-party democracy 
had become the norm in the majority of African countries. More crucially, civil society 
itself had become part and parcel of the vocabulary of politics, and such, it seemed, 
was its newfound significance that when no one was watching, governments even 
sought civil society’s input on the direction and content of public policy.  Anyone 
faintly familiar with the nature of politics in postcolonial Africa might have known 
that this new marriage would not last. As such, the backlash against civil society had 
started almost about the same time that civil society had wormed its way into the 
mainstream of the social and political process. LWOT has  thus played into the hands 
of some states in Africa, such as Uganda, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Benin,  where at the 
best of times, the resurgence of civil society has tended to be viewed with barely 
disguised unease.  
The events of 11 September  2001 and the ensuing LWOT were, therefore, for 
many African states, a godsend. Specifically, the LWOT has been used as a license to 
criminalize the opposition and clamp down on civil society. This criminalization has 
involved, but not been limited to, the (judicial) persecution of human rights and pro-
democracy organizations and individuals who have often been accused of either 
sponsoring terror or fomenting treason. Perhaps reassured by its excellent standing 
with western governments and international donors, Nigeria’s civilian government, for 
example, has clamped down on ethnic based associations whose leaders and suspected 
followers have endured extended spells in jail. In Nigeria, ordinary membership of 
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groups such as the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra 
(MASSOB) and the O’dua People’s Congress (OPC) is sufficient to earn the wrath of 
the state  (Bah 2005, Agbu 2004).  In return for becoming an ally in the War on Terror 
the then US Secretary of State, Colin Powell agreed in December 2001 to Uganda 
President Yoweri Museveni’s request to list the Lord’s Resistance Army as a terrorist 
organization. According to a 2004 Christian Aid Report on Aid in the new Cold War 
the introduction of the 2002 Anti-Terrorist Act in Uganda, which amongst other things 
brands any organization establishing a dialogue with the Lord’s Resistance Army as a 
collaborator,  has stifled the initiatives of groups such as the Acholi Religious Leaders 
Peace Initiative to resolve the conflict through peaceful means. Other examples of 
backlash include the constant changing of the rules of the game by some African 
governments (as in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Nigeria) in relation to the functioning 
of civil society organizations (CSOs) and the demonization of NGOs and other CSOs 
as Western agents sponsored by foreign interests with dubious agendas,  Namibia, 
South Africa and Uganda being cases in point.  
These cases discussed above illustrate the growing, overt clampdown on civil 
society.   The authorities in various ‘managed’ democracies  or authoritarian states are 
justifying their actions using the logic of LWOT and in the name of protecting national 
security and preserving political stability.  What is worrying is that this backlash 
against NGOs in particular, and civil society in general, threatens to close off the 
spaces where alternative ideas may be expressed, where genuine dialogue may emerge,  
and where democracy may flourish. While it remains to be seen how these events will 
develop in coming years, the prognosis is not very optimistic.       
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4. Implicit Backlash: Reining in and Rethinking the Usefulness of 
Civil Society  
 
 
  Unlike the overt backlash in which civil society is monitored, demonized and  
repressed, there has been a less obvious, but nonetheless insidious form of backlash 
against civil society which can be observed in certain donor policies and practices that 
began in the late 1990s and are intensifying in the post September 11 context.     In 
their effort to promote the development of civil society and to improve the 
effectiveness and accountability of civil society organizations, donor organizations 
have implemented certain policies and practices, such as an emphasis on coordinated 
and centralized aid delivery, the  funding of certain civil society organizations over 
others, and a growing focus on technical service delivery.  The efforts of  coordination 
and disciplined networking, which are aimed at improving aid delivery and also the 
advocacy work of CSOs,  are to some extent informed by the needs of international 
actors to focus their access points within countries and to minimize transaction costs. 
The policies and practices have inadvertently restricted the diversity of civil society by 
putting an emphasis on the technical service delivery functions of civil society 
organizations at the expense of their potential emancipatory and political roles. These 
policies and practices present an implicit backlash that is less obvious and more 
tempered than the manifestations described in the previous section.   
For instance, while on the one hand donors were trying to support the 
development of civil society and the growth of democracy, on the other hand they were 
also attempting to if not  regulate, then at least to monitor and evaluate what CSOs 
were doing and how they were doing it in an effort to ensure that money was being 
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well spent and that the objectives agreed upon were being met.    With these important 
and valid  concerns over accountability and effectiveness, however,  a tendency 
emerged among donors to work with a limited number of organizations as the 
representatives of civil society in a given context. Donors particularly funded those 
organizations that were  seen as  amenable to regulation. Grants were repeatedly given 
to those organizations that had proven their ability to follow procedures and reporting 
requirements established by donors while newer, smaller,  less recognized, and more 
politically active organizations were left without funds.  Organizations that were able 
to communicate using the language and discourses current amongst donors were also 
more likely to be successful in  their grant applications.   
More worrying for civil society actors involved in development is the shift in 
donor aid policies towards budget support, whereby funds are given directly to 
national governments or particular sectors of government.  This shift, which will 
reduce the amount of direct funding from donors to CSOs,  is poignantly exemplified 
in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.7   The Declaration refers to civil 
society only once throughout the entire document and only then it is to urge the 
governments of recipient countries to co-ordinate aid at all levels and to encourage the 
participation of civil society in development initiatives (2005: 3).  NGOs, which in the 
1990s were active in all forms of development work are not even mentioned once in 
the ten page Declaration.  The Declaration is an indication  that donors are beginning 
to move away from their focus on civil society and are returning to a policy of 
providing direct aid to governments. The latter policy had been abandoned in the late 
1980s following concerns among donors that the governments of developing countries 
were too corrupt and inefficient to promote development.  The drive to (re)centralize 
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development funding threatens to marginalize civil society  and diminish its ability and 
role to act as an important check upon state power (Lönnqvist 2006: 1).  
The case of civil society involvement in HIV/AIDS policies in Africa is an area 
where some of the policies mentioned earlier, such as coordination and technical 
service delivery,  have been put into practice. First, the shift in approach from framing 
HIV/AIDS as a disease requiring medical and social solutions to an emergency 
requiring immediate attention has affected the work of CSOs in HIV/AIDS in Africa. 
This shift has gradually become instrumental in turning civil society activism into an 
apolitical service delivery tool because the logic of emergency suggested that  
immediate needs should take precedence over larger structural and political issues.  
Questions about the rights of the people living with the disease, their access to 
resources, the structural dimensions of poverty,  and related issues came to be seen as 
less relevant because the first order of business was to provide people with what is 
required for them to survive.   
Second, the adoption of the Three Ones8 principles at a meeting of UNAIDS in 
2004 is an indication of the shift by governments and international institutions to 
regulate, and better manage civil society.  Under the Three Ones, there is one agreed 
HIV/AIDS action framework that provides the basis for coordinating the work of all 
partners; one national AIDS coordinating authority, with a broad based multi-sector 
mandate; and one agreed country-level monitoring and evaluation system (World 
Health Organization).  The national AIDS Councils that have been created under the 
Three Ones principles are seen as platforms for civil society and other actors to 
coordinate their work and to link the international policy interventions and ideas with 
civil society organizations. While they may lead to some coordination of efforts, albeit 
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this is not proven,  there is no doubt that they also act as a centralizing and filtering 
force because recognition by the Councils has become an important factor determining 
access to and eligibility for receiving funding.  
These efforts at coordinating and reining in the different and often competing 
segments of civil society  are an indication of  the concern among donors over the 
diversity of civil society and the politicized nature of certain CSOs.  Even the most 
civil society-friendly of international organizations, the United Nations, has, under the 
banner of 'regulating' civil society input, begun to espouse similar inhibiting measures. 
The Panel on UN-Civil Society Relations, which advised Kofi Annan in 2005, argued 
that ‘‘if the United Nations brought everyone relevant into each debate, it would have 
endless meetings without conclusion’ and recommended ‘disciplined networking and 
peer review processes of the constituencies’ (United Nations 2004:32) in order to 
streamline consultation. It also encouraged higher consultation status for coordinated 
networks, which would ‘have the greatest right to speak, distribute statements and 
interact with bureaux and substantive secretariats in influencing agendas’(United 
Nations 2004: 79).    
While it remains to be seen whether this new drive toward coordination and 
harmonization will lead to more effective aid delivery and development programmes, 
one thing which is clear is that some of these coordination and disciplining efforts are 
threatening to stifle the expression of diverse voices within civil society. Yet diversity 
and debate are essential elements of deliberative democracy.  As Iris Marion Young 
puts it, ‘Confrontation with different perspectives, interests and cultural meanings 
teaches individuals the partiality of their own, and reveals to them their own 
experience as perspectival’ (1997: 403).  From a policy perspective, such listening 
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‘across differences’, Young maintains, allows people to understand something about 
the ways that policies affect others that are differently situated.  
Finally, the tendencies to support particular organizations, attempts at 
coordinating civil society and focusing on technical rather than political and structural 
issues, have in turn led to another, related, backlash that has emerged from the 
grassroots, smaller organizations and social movements. Given the fact that many 
NGOs in developing and transition countries are not membership organizations and are 
largely reliant on foreign funding, they often do not enjoy broad based support from 
within their communities.  Very often smaller, grassroots organizations and social 
movements view the larger, well-funded NGOs as being donor-driven, Western-
oriented, self-serving organizations that are far more accountable to foreign donors 
than their local communities and beneficiaries.   Subsequently, many organizations that 
are consistently awarded grants have come to be seen as Western ‘pawns’ or ‘agents’ 
by the local press and public.   This has meant that as the pressure from governments 
has increased, many NGOs in developing and transition countries now find themselves 
between a rock and a hard place in that as they are increasingly encountering 
repression from their governments, they are simultaneously not receiving  support 
from their communities.   
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5. Conclusion  
 
 
Having examined the various overt and implicit forms of backlash against civil 
society, what then are the implications of this multi-layered backlash and  what should 
civil society(ies) do?  First, if we accept the assertion that vibrant and independent civil 
societies are essential for democracy, then it is important to protect the space where 
such civil societies may flourish and develop. This space, as we have maintained in 
this essay, is increasingly shrinking in the wake of the Long War on Terror.  The 
various anti-terror laws and anti-money laundering regulations that have been passed 
since 11 September  have been intended to enhance national security and to provide 
greater oversight over funds collected and distributed by civil society organizations. 
The general querying of civil society and the passage of anti-terror legislation is 
creating a chill factor which leads to self-censorship among civil society organizations 
and greater conservatism, regulation, and oversight from donors. Obviously some 
regulation and accountability is important for ensuring the probity of CSOs and is 
indeed welcomed by CSOs. However, too much control threatens to stifle healthy 
debate and lead to fear, alienation, and self-censorship, which are all antithetical to 
democratic governance. What is most worrying is that these tendencies are not just 
occurring in  ‘managed’ democracies or authoritarian states, but that they are occurring 
in some of the developed democracies as well such as the UK and USA.   Even a civil 
society haven such as the UN has begun to use the discourse of ‘disciplining’ and 
‘regulating’ civil society. If civil society is to retain its emancipatory dimension and its 
role in deliberating on the values governing society, it will need to respond 
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strategically and pro-actively to the emerging backlash in the context of the Long War 
on Terror.  
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Notes 
 
 
1 This essay is the product of ongoing discussions amongst the five authors. The 
main draft of the essay was written by Jude Howell and Armine Ishkanian, with 
written contributions on Africa from Ebenezer Obadare, on HIV/AIDS from 
Hakan Seckinelgin and on global civil society from Marlies Glasius.  
 
2 The phrase ‘long war’ came into use in 2005 and now appears to have been 
adopted by the Bush Administration in referring to the global war on terror.   
Bush first used the new name in his 2006 State of the Union address when he 
said,  "Our own generation is in a long war against a determined enemy." 
[emphasis added]  http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/index.html  
Given the increasing usage of the phrase ‘long war on terror’ we decided to use 
it instead of ‘global war on terror’ throughout the article. 
 
3 ‘Managed democracy’ (upravlyayemaya demokratiya) is a phrase that was 
introduced by the Russian authorities in the early 2000s and is now 
increasingly being used to describe the situation in other former Soviet states 
(e.g., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan etc.). It refers to a situation in which the formal 
institutions and practices (e.g., elections)  of democracies exist but are 
controlled and managed by the authorities.   
 
4 Non-governmental organizations are formally registered organizations that may 
be small or large,  which may or may not be membership based, which are 
engaged in development, humanitarian relief, advocacy, and poverty reduction 
work at local, national, and global levels around the world.  NGOs are part of 
civil society, but civil society is much more than NGOs.  Civil society refers to 
the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and 
values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, 
family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil 
society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil 
society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional 
forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil 
societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, 
development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women's 
organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trades 
unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions 
and advocacy group (LSE Centre for Civil Society).  
 
5 This is a pre-print of an article submitted to Development in Practice, which is 
available at 
http://journalsonline.tandf.co.uk/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0961-4524. 
 
6 The country members of this organization are Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, China and Russia. 
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7 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is a document that was adopted at 
the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Paris from 28 February – 2 
March, 2005.   
 
8 The Three Ones  agreement promoting universal coordination in the fight 
against AIDS was adopted at a meeting held by UNAIDS, the UK and the US 
on 25 April 2004 in Washington D.C. 
http://ews.unaids.org/public/thethreeones/  
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